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Cybercrimes are facts of the modern technological society. While extant literature proposes a variety of prescriptive practices 
to combat cybercrimes, there is scant research to address how organizational leaders should minimize the impact of 
cybercrimes on their companies and the community after they have occurred. This study addresses the steps leaders should 
take in the aftermath of cybercrimes and proposes a four-stage leadership model consisting of best practices to guide leaders 
in preparing, responding, and recovering from a digital or cybersecurity attack. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Cybercrimes, cybersecurity, and cyber forensics address the awareness and risks for organizations in today’s modern digital 
landscape. Organizations do not plan to fail, but as businesses utilize technology to compete in the marketplace, corporate 
hacks and data breaches occur. Plenty of research has been done regarding how to prevent cybercrimes, how to increase 
cybersecurity, and how to analyze the cyber forensics component in the aftermath, but there is a gap in literature addressing 
organizational digital crimes and how leadership minimizes risk for the consumer and the organization. Cybersecurity is no 
longer solely an issue for the IT department, and leaders need to prepare their procedures for combatting the ever-evolving 
risks (Mccollum, 2012). 
Emergency plans—whether natural disaster or cybercrime—should be regularly updated. As a result, this paper aims to 
address the question: what steps should leaders take in the aftermath of cybercrimes? To address this question, a four-stage 
leadership model consisting of best practices is proposed to guide leaders in preparing, responding, and recovering from a 
digital or cybersecurity attack. 
CYBER BREACHES 
In today’s modern digital landscape, organizations are vulnerable to cybercrime. For example, in 2013, the Target stores data 
breach affected 70 million people (Manworren, Letwat, & Daily, 2016), while in 2015, the Anthem Health Insurance hack 
affected 80 million people (MacIntyre et al., 2017). With the Equifax breach in 2017, 143 million people were affected 
(Moore, 2017), and Yahoo’s 2013 cybersecurity failure resulted in 1 billion breached accounts (Cheng, Liu, & Yao, 2017). 
This data indicates that no single industry is the primary targeted; however, common denominators in every company include 
a leadership team and digital presence. Furthermore, it is unlikely and nearly impossible for companies to remove themselves 
from the internet. Yet, despite all the preparation, cybercrime still remains a major concern for every industry. 
Challenges of Managing Cybercrimes 
Computer-related crimes have three distinct categories: input tampering, throughput tampering, and output tampering. While 
input scams are the most common computer-related crime, it is also the easiest kind to prevent by utilizing effective 
supervision and controls. Throughput crimes are rarer, due to the programming knowledge required, but output crimes are 
increasing, and these involve theft of computer-related reports and information files (Ionescu, Mirea, & Blajan, 2011).  
Staff constraints and lack of training for digital crimes suggest law enforcement investigation resources will be thin. As a 
result, company leaders need to recognize the challenges and limitations placed upon law enforcement (Gogolin & Jones, 
2010). According to Gogolin and Jones (2010), most law enforcement officers chose their profession for traditional law 
enforcement, as opposed to dealing with cybercrimes, leaving the FBI as the sole federal agency to handle cybercrimes.  
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Cybersecurity Risk Management 
With the rapid pace of technology changing the way consumers behave, corporate executives are charged with the 
responsibility of producing more and staying ahead of the trends. Managing risks associated with cybercrimes requires a 
commitment from leadership to pursue ongoing training in order to acquire up-to-date knowledge and skills. Scammers and 
hackers continue to hone their craft and develop workarounds to complement the new technology. Leadership in 
organizations needs to understand the complexity of cyberattacks and the resources it will take to prevent them and adopt a 
prescriptive approach to cybersecurity risk management (Paté‐Cornell et al., 2018). 
Cyber Forensics 
Law enforcement and digital forensic teams need to work collaboratively to collect, preserve, examine, and transfer digital 
evidence in a timely and accurate manner. For example, Bulbul, Yavuzcan, and Ozel (2013) proposed a crime scene 
procedure model in order to ensure a standardization among all professionals interacting with the investigation. Similarly, 
Montasari, Peltola, and Evans (2015) proposed an integrated computer forensics investigation process model (ICFIPM) to 
assist in the detection of computer crime investigations. Such models offer generalized guidelines that cyber forensic teams 
can leverage to address cybercrimes. 
FOUR-STAGE CYBERCRIME LEADERSHIP MODEL 
According to Mccollum (2012), digital crimes are on the rise, and cyberattacks are a top economic crime. Bhattacharya 
(2011) examined information security issues within small businesses and found a significant correlation between leadership 
styles and the level of concern toward information security problems within small businesses. Ineffective leadership styles 
can lead to businesses needing to take reactive measures against cybercrime. As organizations become increasingly 
dependent on information systems, leaders in all industries must recognize the issue of cybersecurity. According to Gupta 
and Hammond (2005), organizations with strong leaders engaged in more preventive efforts than organizations with weaker 
support from higher management.  
Once an organization is the victim of a cybercrime, best practices for leaders in the aftermath need to be developed and 
documented. A four-stage model consisting of a set of processes is proposed to guide leaders during the aftermath of 
cybercrimes. 
Stage 1: Recognizing Vulnerabilities 
Events of a crisis typically unfold quickly, by the minute rather than the hour. After a cybercrime has occurred, leaders need 
to recognize and take ownership of the problem. Even as they rely on their teams, they should insert themselves into the 
process, intervening early and often. Berghel (2014) addressed the leadership failures in the National Security Complex and 
argued that leadership is the root of the cybersecurity problem. Turning a blind eye or ignoring existing vulnerabilities will 
result in a greater impact of the cybercrime and more lasting effects (Fischbacher-Smith, 2015). 
Stage 2: Executing a Crisis Management Plan 
Crisis management plans save valuable time by delegating tasks and providing critical information (Avery, Graham, & Park, 
2016). Leadership in today’s digital age, particularly effective cybersecurity leadership, is complex and involves a technical, 
legal, and ethical skillset (Berghel, 2014). Leadership after a cyberattack should be prepared to immediately respond with a 
well-prepared crisis management plan. Leaders need to decide if operations can resume immediately or if there is a 
contingency plan in place. According to Kowalski (2018), crisis management plans should be developed by the company’s 
leadership team along with asset managers, legal counsel, and insurance providers.   
Stage 3: Educating the Community 
After the Exxon-Valdez Oil Spill in March of 1989, 11 million gallons of crude tanker oil were spilled into the Prince 
William Sound of Alaska (Cohen, 1995). The Mayor of Valdez led no major clean-up effort. Furthermore, the Exxon CEO 
failed to make a public statement until two weeks after the spill.  
 
In contrast, during the BP oil spill in April of 2010, an explosion on Deepwater Horizon oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico near 
Louisiana killed 11 people, injured 16, and leaked an estimated 210 million gallons of oil over the course of 87 days (Mills & 
Koliba, 2016). The CEO of BP released a video to the public apologizing for the spill and BP’s actions, provided updates on 
the clean-up, and committed to assist financially for the next 50 years. 
 
To help combat digital crimes, leaders should adopt BP’s approach and become the voice of reason and display resiliency 
(Armour, 2017). Leaders need to adopt an entrepreneurial approach to uniting communities through social capital (Cleveland 
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& Cleveland, 2018). Their goal should be to commit relentlessly and honestly to the populace throughout the crisis. To 
accomplish this, they should leverage news conferences giving clean-up tips and plans for up-to-the-minute progress reports 
to build trust in your leadership. Moreover, there should be a constant feedback mechanism to ensure that the information 
being disseminated is absorbed and acted upon properly (Goldes et al., 2017). 
 
Stage 4: Conducing After Action Reviews 
Leaders should study the lessons learned from prior victims of cybercrimes. Such lessons can be leveraged as action plans 
and best practices (Cleveland, 2012). Leaders should adopt strategies based on the most proven approaches that have worked 
for cybercrime victims in the past. These strategies can help organizations recover quicker and minimize the overall impact of 
the crimes. Furthermore, leaders should not overlook those who might not have a strong voice in their organizations and take 
care not to shut out others due to a difference of views or opinions. Rather, leaders should utilize after action reviews with 
their employees to brainstorm plausible actions to solve a cybercrime as soon as possible (Ariely, 2014). These reviews 
should involve reviews of the cyber incident, immediate institution of changes, and lessons on how to improve in the future. 
Figure 1 summarizes the four-stage model as proposed in this study. 
 
 
Figure 1. Four-stage leadership model during the aftermath of cybercrimes 
 
CONCLUSION 
Competent leadership in a time of crisis is essential. Whether a natural disaster or a cyberattack, citizens are affected and 
lives are changed. This paper attempts to address the question: what steps should leaders take in the aftermath of 
cybercrimes? To do so, it proposed a four-stage leadership model consisting of best practices to assist leadership actions post-
incident of cybercrimes. Future research will validate the model using a qualitative study of leaders before and after the 
occurrence of cybercrimes. 
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